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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
s.

?EUEL

KOHLER, et al. ,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

vs.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
KOHLER

GARDEN CITY,

Defendant/Appellant.

BIRDIE

PROPERTIES,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 17346

GARDEN CITY, et al. ,

Defendants/Appellants.

* * * * * * *
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/respondents Kohler

(hereinafter sometimes the

"Kohlers") brought this action to quiet title to certain property
which they own in Garden City against adverse claims of defendant/
appellant Garden City (hereinafter sometimes "Garden City") that a
portion of the Kohlers' property had been impliedly dedicated as a
public thoroughfare.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court quieted title in favor of the Kohlers and
awarded them injunctive and monetary relief.
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Kohlers seek affirmation of the lower court's J· Udoment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Kohlers agree that appellant is a duly incorporated
town in the State of Utah.

The balance of the statement of facts

set forth by Garden City is argumentative and undocumented.

The

Kohlers submit that the record demonstrates the following.
In 1967, when the Kohlers purchased their property on tf.e
shore of Bear Lake in Garden City, they had no knowledge of
claimed "right-of-way."

~y

They did have notice of a foot-path over·

grown with weeds which was occasionally used by a neighbor who was
able to drive his jeep down the path for access to his property
(Transcript, hereinafter "Tr." 46).

This foot path, however, was

located at all times south of the surveyed boundary of the Kohlers'
property and did not encroach upon their property (Tr. 13, 14, 41).
The record demonstrates that the Kohlers had no knowledge of a
claim by Garden City to a right-of-way, at least not until 1972
when the City widened the foot path to the north causing it to

cross and encroach upon the southern portion of the Kohler propert)
(Tr. 56) •

The Kohlers were not informed of the extent of Garden

City's claim until 1974

(Tr.

91).

Contrary to appellant's as~r

ti on, nowhere does the record demonstrate that "its right-of-way"
was "historically dedicated and established by the original plat
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and survey"

(Brief of Appellant Garden City (hereinafter "Br." l ,

]).

Finally, and contrary to Garden City's Statement of
~cts, the Kohlers do indeed contest the existence and extent of
~blic

assess to Bear Lake from the end of First South in Garden

dty.

This issue always has been and continues to be a major one

in this lawsit.
~e

This entire case hinges upon whether the use of

path in question by the public has been sufficient to consti-

tute an implied dedication under §27-12-89, Utah Code Ann.

(1953)

and, if so, the location and width of the highway so dedicated.
The trial court found that proof of such use was lacking and

granted Judgment in favor of the Kohlers (Memorandum Decision, p.
2).

ARGUMENT
I.
GARDEN CITY FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF
ESTABLISHING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF THAT
THE KOHLERS' LAND HAD BEEN DEDICATED AS A
PUBLIC HIGHWAY.
The burden of a party who appeals the Judgment of a trial
court and the duty of the reviewing court were described in the
~e

of Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961) as

follows:

In considering the attack on the findings
and judgment of the trial court it is.our duty
to follow these cardinal rules of review: to
indulge them a presumption of validity and
correctness; to require the appellant to.sustain the burden of showing error; to review the
record in the light most favorable to them; and
not to disturb them if they find substantial
support in the evidence.
11 Utah 2d at 390.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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See also _R_._C_._T_o_l_m_a_n__
C_o_n_s_t_r_u'---c-=t--'i_o-=n'---v-'-'-.-..:.cM:..Yc..:t::.:o::.:n:.:_.::W..:::a:..::t:..::e:..;r:_:A:..:.::'.s~s:::-o~c:.::i~ac_:t:.::i~on,
50
P. 2d 780

(Utah, 1977).

If there is a reasonable basis in the evi

dence to support the trial court's findings, they should not be
disturbed.

Holman v.

Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499

(Utah, 1976).

Indee:

the findings and Judgment of the trial court are entitled to a
presumption of correctness and credibility; the appellant must
clearly demonstrate that they are in error.
Utah, N.A. v.

\~right,

521 P.2d 563

29 Utah 2d 280, 508 P.2d 542

First Security Bank 1

(Utah, 1974); Latimer v. Katz,

(1973).

Garden City has not alleged that the trial court's ac·
tions were arbitrary or an abuse of discretion.

The only

left for review is whether the trial court weighed the
under the appropriate legal standard.

evid~~

Once it is determined

the appropriate legal standards were applied, the Judgment
affirmed.

matt~

tha~

must~

The evidence adduced at trial need be examined only so

far as necessary to decide whether approporiate legal principals
were applied.
The major issues raised by Garden City in its appeal,
namely, whether a "right-of-way" was extinguished and the width

0

that right-of-way (Docketing Statement, Issues A and B; Br. Part
II) beg the entire question on appeal.

This case at the trial

court turned on the question of whether or not such a right-of-wa
was ever in fact created.

· guish·
The questions of width and ext1n
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'~.ent once a right-of-way is created were not addressed by the trial
I

court nor need they be reached on appeal.*

'

Utah law is clear that property may be dedicated to
?ublic use as a highway in only one of two ways.

~.I c~icated

Property can be

expressly or dedication may be implied by public use.

[ this case, the City claims no record interest in the land.

In

Thus,

' if there has been a dedication it must be implied under the stand-

~1 ard articulated

in §27-12-89, Utah Code Ann.

(1953).

That section

orovide s:
A highway shall be
dedicated and abandoned
public when it has been
public thoroughfare for
(emphasis added)

deemed to have been
to the use of the
continuously used as a
a period of ten years.

Earlier cases under this and the prior common law rule looked at
ilie actual intent of the grantor in allowing public use of his

Ii,

1

property.

I Whittaker

I Lynch,

See, e.g., Wilson v. Hull, et al., 24 P. 799 (1890);
v. Ferguson, 6 Utah 240, 51 P. 980 (1898); Shettler v.

23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955

(1901).

Later cases have looked at

the question by more objective standards, but still focus on con' duct from which the intent of the grantor in allowing a use of his

if

l)

~roperty adverse to his interests may be implied.

* The issues of the creation and width of a public thorough~u were recognized and briefed by Garden City after trial (Defendant' s Post-Trial Memorandum, pp. 2, 3). With regard to the
~~h of the claimed right-of-way, it is interesting to note that
Garden City's Counterclaim is silent on the subject of width.
A.lthough a 9 9 foot dedication had previously been claimed, at trial
Garden City argued for a 66 foot roadway (Defendant's Post-Trial
)lemorandum, p. 3) .
on appeal, Garden City has elected to renew its
claim to 99 feet (Br. 6, 15).
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1
Because of the pre-eminence of private property rights,
Utah case law clearly states that the burden of proof in is on the
party asserting an implied public dedication.

This Court, in

Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966), stated:
In connection with this review we deem it
appropriate to note our agreement that the
dedication of one's property to a public use
should not be regarded lightly and that certain
principles should be adhered to.
The presumption is in favor of the property owner; and the
burden of establishing public use for the required period of time is on those claiming it.
(emphasis added; footnote omitted)
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court
determination of an implied dedication and stated:
Irrespective of the departure from theory or
proof, we think the burden of proving a real
public use continuously for ten years was not
met here in light of principles to the effect
that dedication of rights to the public generally, must be displayed by clear and convincing
evidence.
This we say in view of the other
principle that on review we canvass the facts
in a light more favorable to the conclusion of
the arbiter of the facts.
These principles
clash somewhat, but where individual property
rights are at stake we must not treat such
rights lightly. Petersen v. Combe, 438 P.2d
545, 546 (Utah, 1968).
(emphasis added; footnotes omitted)
Thus, at trial Garden City was required to establish a dedi~ti®
by clear and convincing evidence.

The evidence adduced at trial

indicates, and the trial court found, that Garden City failed to
meet its burden.
The City demonstrated no evidence of use before the
Kohlers' land was patented by the United States Government.

-6-
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evidence adduced at trial was predominantly by people who owned
contiguous property and by their relatives and invitees.

There was

evidence that cattle were occasionally driven down the lane to
~asture.

Several individuals testified that as children they would

visit their cousins and use the lane for access to the lake in the
summer and for sledding in the winter.

There was evidence of

occasional use by automobiles, but this again was predominantly by
adjacent land owners and their relatives and invitees.

There was,

in short, no evidence of continuous use of the lane by the public
as a thoroughfare for a period of ten years.

The City simply did

not meet its burden of establishing an implied dedication.

Indeed,

the Court found that "if there was any public use to the lake in
that area that it was a use that was occasional for pedestrian and
cattle traffic"

(Memorandum Decision, p. 2).

This finding was

neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion.
Equally important is the fact that the lane was at all
1

times located to the south of the Kohler property.

The only survey

in the record, that of Robert Wilson, a licensed surveyor of eminent qualifications, demonstrates that the road or "foot path" was
located to the south of the southern boundary of the Kohler property when he surveyed it in 1967 (Tr. 7, 8, 13, 14).
i

The lane

about which he and other witnesses testified was narrow.

The area

around the lane was swampy and divided from the pasture to the
north by livestock fences.

Even if the evidence could establish an

implied dedication by the property owner over whose land the lane

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ran, that dedication could not operate to dedicate any part of~
Kohler land over which the land did not run.

It is axiomatic that

a property owner cannot dedicate by implication that which he cou)'
not dedicate expressly.

Indeed, the court found:

That any such use in any event was located to
the south of the southern boundary of the
Kohler property and no demonstrated use has
been shown to the satisfaction of the Court of
property belonging to the Kohlers until the
encoachment by the City in 1972.
(Memorandum
Decision, p. 2)
If the City de sires to take land to the north of Kohlers' boundari
line--land over which no public use occurred prior to 1972--they

I

1

must accord due process of law, condemn the land and compensate it: 1
owners.
The Utah Supreme Court case which is most instructive
here is Petersen v. Combe, supra.

As set forth above, this case

provides the standard of clear and convincing evidence by which a
dedication must be demonstrated.

Petersen involved the alleged

implied dedication of a dead end road, the property on
of which was owned by various individuals.

eit~r ri~1

The Court stated that I

these individuals, by virtue of their land ownership, were entitle: I
to use the road and that "they or their personal visitors

cannot~/

numbered in the class of members of the general public using such
road in a fashion that might ripen into a dedication of a ro~
under the statute."

438 P.2d at 545.

The Court further notedtha:

the road was used by various agencies of government for access to
the land at the end of the dead end road and that Weber county
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equipment graded and maintained the road off and on during the

I period in question.

The Court posed this question:

Was there sufficient evidence by competent
testimony, by witnesses who were not selfserving, to show by clear and convincing evidence, that the public generally,--not just a
few having their own special and private interests in the road, had used the road continuously for ten years? Id. at 546, 547.
The Court then answered the question in light of the facts adduced
·1·

at trial in the negative.
The facts in Petersen present some helpful parallels to

I

the situation here.

Both cases involved evidence of use predomi-

; I nantly by adjacent land owners and their relatives and invitees.
In both cases municipal funds were apparently used for some maintenance of the roads in question.

Petersen, like the instant case,

involved a dead end road--i t was not a thoroughfare as required by
the statute.

The term "thoroughfare" is defined in Black's Law

Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition, 1968 at page 1651, as:

I
:1

A street or passage through which one can
fare (travel;) that is, a street or highway
affording an unobstructed exit at each end into
another street or public passage.
(emphasis in
original; citing inter alia Morris v. Blunt,
161 P. 1127 (Utah, 1916).
The lane in question here is not a "thoroughfare."

It does not

allow an unobstructed exit at each end; it does not provide transit
between two other lanes or public ways; it does not even connect a
public highway with any land or facility owned by Garden City.

The

fact that there is no public facility, no beach and no boat ramp,
means that for the public to use Bear Lake from the right-of-way

-9-
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!,

claimed by Garden City, the public must trespass on private

Prop-

erty to turn vehicles around, to launch boats, to water stock, m
even swim from the beach.
at trial

The 66-foot access claimed by the City

(Post-Trial Memorandum, p. 3) and the 99-foot easement

claimed on appeal

(Br. 6) are still insufficient for these uses

without the use of private lands not yet claimed by the City.
The three cases cited by appellant in support of its

assertion that an implied dedication occurred provide no nourishrre .. /
for their argument.
305, 64 P.2d 955

In all three cases, Shettler v. Lynch, 23 Uta:

(1901), Wilson v. Hull, 7 Utah 90, 24 P. 799 1rn:I

and Whittaker v. Ferguson, 6 Utah 240, 51 P.

980 (1898) an "animus

dedicandi" or intention to dedicate was found in the land owner
because of extensive and continuous public use of his land.
following distinguishing language from the court in those

The

caRs~

instructive:
• if the land of which that covered by the
road is a part is unenclosed, and not appropriated to any special use by the owner, the fact
that the public travels over it occasionally,
as the custom may be to cross vacant and unoccupied lands without objection from the owner,
does not authorize any infererence of an intention to dedicate.
Under such circumstances the
mere failure to manifest an objection does not
authorize an inference that the mind of the
owner consents.
The inference in that case is
that the proprietor did not understand that the
land was being appropriated for the permanent
use of the public as a highway. Wilson v. Hull,
24 P. at 800.
In Shettler v. Lynch, like the current case, the Judge had W
resolve some conflicts in the evidence.

The Supreme court stated,

in upholding his ruling:
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

I

It is true, there is some conflict in the evidence relating to the dedication by the owner
of the land and the acceptance by the public
and the findings of fact hereinbefore referr~d
to are thus based upon conflicting evidence,
but there appears to be a decided preponderance
of proof in support of them, and therefore this
court will not disturb them.
Likewise as to
the other findings, and the conclusions of law
of which the appellants complain.
In such a
case the findings of the trial court will not
be disturbed unless they are so manifestly
erroneous as to demonstrate some oversight or
mistake.
64 P. at 956.

I

The case most stressed in Garden City's Brief is that of
Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 29 Utah 2d 322, 509 P.2d 352 (1973).
This case is clearly distinguishable from the present case.

In

Hunsaker, the existence of a highway easement across the northern
portion of plaintiff's land was admitted by all parties.

The only

question was whether that easement was one or two rods wide.

The

trial court held that the highway is presumed to be of the statutory width and that the evidence was not sufficient to rebut that
( presumption.

In the instant case, no continuous public use of the

land now owned by the Kohlers was shown.

Even if a dedication of a

right-of-way by the land owner to the south is shown, a fortiori
the entire width of that dedication must have been of his land--the
only land which he could dedicate.
More helpful is the case of Bozo v. Ogden City, 285 P.
1

1033 (Utah, 1930).

It might be said that Bozo is the Hunsaker case

without the existing right-of-way.

In Bozo, plaintiffs sued to

quiet title to the north 4 9 1/2 feet of their property which the
City claimed was part of a public street known as 20th Street.

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The

T
trial court found the plaintiffs were owners in fee simple of the

1

entire tract, including the north 49 1/2 feet, and that the strip

!

of land in dispute had never been opened to the public or used by
the public for travel, even though a dedication of another 49 l/l
feet north of plaintiffs' property line had been dedicated as a
i

street.

The streets both west and east of 20th Street were 99 fee·.
·

in width.

I

1

In light of this evidence, the Utah Supreme Court af-

firmed the trial court and held that " [ t] here was no dedication b

1·

I

opening and user" of plaintiffs' property.

285 P. at 1034.

Int~

instant case, the evidence demonstrated and the trial court found
insufficient public use to imply a dedication.

Even if such user /

Ic

had been found, the evidence demonstrates that it was of the lane
to the south of Kohlers' property.

As in Bozo, a dedication of tk I

south 49 1/2 feet does not necessitate a dedication of the north
49 1/2 feet.
I

Garden City also cites the case of Jeremy v. Bertagnole,(
et al., 101 Utah 1, 116 P.2d 420 (1941).

This case involved East

Canyon Road, a 25 mile road from Old Highway 40
towns of Morgan and Hennifer.

I

(now I-80) to the

The Supreme Court affirmed the tria:/

court's ruling of an implied dedication, citing findings of the
court that the road was
a well traveled, worked, and defined public
road . . . that it [was] and had been for 60
years continuously used by ranchmen, stockmen,
owners of land contiguous and adjacent thereto
and by the public generally for all necessary
and convenient purposes.
101 Utah at 3,
4 (emphasis added).

-12-
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u

f

I ~e

court cited further findings by the trial court that the use of

! the road had been "as general and extensive as though it had been

formally laid out as a public highway by public authority."
~ah at 4.
i

case.

101

The Jeremy case is clearly different from the instant

Jeremy involved a long road connecting a highway with two

I

towns; the instant case involves a dead end lane a couple of hundred yards long used predominantly by contiguous property owners,
relatives, invitees and occasional neighbors.

The evidence in

Jeremy demonstrated a continuous commercial use; the evidence in
ilie present case demonstrates a sporadic use in terms both of
frequency and purpose.

In short, though Jeremy is an instructive

case and one that is often cited by the Utah courts, it is a far

I different case than the one at bar.
Appellant also cites the case of Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah
2d 395, 326 P.2d 107

(1958).

Boyer involved "Middle Canyon Road"

which connected Highway 133 with a town called "Grass Creek."

The

evidence in that case demonstrated a "continuous and uninterrupted
use of Middle Canyon Road" for the hauling of coal from mines, for
the driving of cattle and sheep, and for other uses for a period
exceeding 50 years.

7 Utah 2d at 397.

The court noted that the

public used the road for these purposes in travelling from Grass
Creek and various other points to and from Highway 133.

Again, a

thoroughfare de scribed in Boyer v. Clark is a completely different
creature than the dead end lane leading from the end of First South
in Garden City east to Bear Lake.
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T

!

The final case cited by appellant on this point,
Livestock Co. v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353, 259 P.2d 607
nothing to appellant's argument.

~'

(1953) adds

As indicated above, the author;.

ties cited by Garden City on the question of extinguishment of
public rights to an established highway are inapposite to this
discussion.

Because no public thoroughfare was found to exist,

u,:

question of extinguishment is moot.
Again, the case most helpful and instructive here is thi:
of Petersen v. Combe, supra.

The learning of that case

compels~ !

affirmation of Judge Christofferson's ruling.

II.
EXHIBIT 59, A MAP OFFERED BY GARDEN CITY
WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED.
Garden City objects to the exclusion by the trial court
of its offerred Exhibit 59, a map of Garden City.

Contrary to

Garden City's statement, there is no evidence that the map was
prepared "at the behest of the town fathers" of Garden City (Br.
4), or that it "showed the intent of the town fathers . . . andt~
actions and reliance of the community"
eluded for lack of foundation

(Br. 6) .

(Tr. 259, 260).

The map was ex·
Indeed, Mr. Low,

counsel for Garden City, admitted that there was no foundation as
to who originated the map, whether it had any official standing,
whether it was a public record, or whether it was made pursuant ti
deed descriptions (Tr. 260, 261).
In spite of this clear ruling, Garden City argues that
the document should have been admitted under an exception to the
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!

hearsay rule--Rule 63 (27) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

This

assertion ignores the fact that hearsay was not an objection raised
at trial nor was it the basis for the Judge's ruling.
Alternatively, Garden City argues that the document
should have been admitted under Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Eviaence.

Under this rule, an "ancient writing" may be authenticated

and received into evidence
if the judge finds that a ruling (a) is at
least 30 years old at the time it is offered,
and (b) is in such condition as to create no
suspicion concerning its authenticity, and (c)
at the time of its discovery was in a place in
which such a document, if authentic, would
likely be found, it is sufficiently authenticated.
Although there was testimony that the document is in excess of 30
years old, there was no evidence or finding by the court as to
where the document was discovered and the fact that it had been
"all over the country" makes it inherently suspicious (Tr. 256).
The real difficulty with Garden City's assertion that the
map should have been admitted as an ancient document is the fact
that it was never offered as such.

The document was excluded for

lack of foundation and no alternative ground for admission was
proferred.

In his treatise on evidence, Professor McCormick has

stated:
If counsel specifies a purpose for which
the proposed evidence is inadmissible and the
judge excludes, counsel cannot complain of the
ruling on appeal though it could have been
.
rightly admitted for another purpose. McCormick
on Evidence, West Publishing Company, 1972, p.
112.

,,

,I

i,

-15-
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If counsel had an alternative basis for admission of his proposed
exhibit, yet did not allow the judge to consider that ground,

~

cannot be heard now to complain of error in exclusion of the

a~~

ment.
The authorities cited by Garden City in support of its
argument on this point do not support its position.

The first,

8~

A.L.R.2d 915, treats only the competency as evidence of receipts o'
a third person given for money payment.
second, 46 A.L.R.2d 1318

80 A.L.R.2d at 917.

The

(erroneously cited in Garden City's Brief

as 46A A.L.R.2d 31318) states point-blank:

"An ancient map made

under the direction of a private person, or one for which no offi·
cial authorization or recognition appears, is inadmissible
evidence."

46 A.L.R.2d at 1333 (emphasis added).

in

A more succinct

exposition of the Kohlers' position on this document could hardly
be found.
Utah case law is clear that there is a presumption in
favor of the rulings of the trial court, including all aspects of
the proceedings.

This Court has noted such a presumption and

stated:
Upon appeal, appellant has the burden of showing that there was substantial and prejudicial
error which had the effect of depriving him of
the opportunity of a full and fair presentation
and consideration of the disputed issues.
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v.
Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah, 1974).
Thus, Garden City must demonstrate not only that the trial court
,I
Inde1:,
erred, but that such error was substantial and prejudicial.

-16-
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this court has stated that "on appeal, the burden is on the appellant to convince us that the trial court committed error and not
that the appellant should have won the case."

Brigham v. Moon Lake

Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 297, 470 P.2d 393 (1970).
rudge Christofferson's ruling cannot be reversed for error in the

exclusion of evidence unless that error was prejudicial (Rule 5,
Utah Rules of Evidence; Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;

oowey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah,
1978) •

An examination of the record in this case demonstrates
that exclusion of the map, even if error, was harmless to Garden
City's case.

The map was not offered to set a new factual base or

to demonstrate facts that otherwise would not have been in evidence.
Rather, Mr. Low, Garden City's attorney, offered the map "to corres?Ond and corroborate [LaVon Sprouse' s] testimony"

(Tr. 261).

The

court states in its Memorandum Decision that the testimony of the
witnesses was considered in arriving at its conclusion.

Nowhere in

the record is it indicated that the admission of one more map would
have made any difference.

Finally, even if the map did demonstrate

the "intent of the town fathers" as argued by Garden City, that
intent is irrelevant as the cases cited herein and in appellant's
Brief amply demonstrate that it is the land owners' intent, either
express or implied, from which a dedication must be found.
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED INJUNCTIVE AND MONETARY RELIEF.
Garden City noted at trial that the court had granted
Kohlers' Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint.

t

This Complain:

set forth additional i terns of damage occuring after the original
Complaint had been filed.

Garden City then indicated that

it~(

request an opportunity to rebut the evidence relative to these ne·,
elements of damage.

The court replied "We' 11 make that determina·

tion, of course, when you see what the evidence is as to damages,
and if you need additional time, we'll grant it."

The Judge then

indicated that Garden City would "have the opportunity after hear·
ing the testimony, if they feel they need the time to rebut it"
(Tr. 4, emphasis added).

!

The elements of damage presented by the

Kohlers at trial were only those claimed in the original Complain:!
and did not reflect the additional bases for damages claimed in tli

I
Supplemental Complaint.

Garden City offered no evidence on the

!

question of damages nor did it take exception to or object W~
proof offered by the Kohlers.

Garden City did not request addi·

tional time or an opportunity to rebut the evidence introduced by'
the Kohlers.

Such an opportunity was available at the time the

briefing schedule was discussed at the end of the trial (Tr.
264-267).

It has never been the understanding of counsel for p1air·
tiffs that a subsequent hearing would be held to determine the
issue of damages.

Such additional time was to be available to

-18-
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~rden City only if they felt surprised by proof of damages under

the new claims made in the Supplemental Complaint filed on the eve
of trial.

'.

This apparently was also the understanding of the court

as it proceeded to award Kohlers injunctive and monetary relief in
the Memorandum Decision of June 30, 1980.

Not only did Garden City

L:!

fail to request an opportunity to rebut the evidence on damages, at

E',

no time did it seek relief from or an amendment of the Judgment as

a·

r·

it might have under Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The two cases cited by Garden City, Bobo v. Bigbee, 548
! P.2d 224 (Okla. 1976) and Hurley v. Hurley, 127 P.2d 147 (Okla.
1942) are again not helpful on the point pressed by Garden City.
In Bobo a motion for a new trial was filed between the time of

n:I trial and the entry of Judgment.

tt:i

I Garden City in the instant case.

No such motion was filed by
In Hurley, the order at issue on

!

appeal did not purport to be a final judgment and expressly left
open and reserved for further consideration and decision the right
·complained of.

In the instant case, Judge Christofferson' s deci-

sion and subsequent Judgment determined the rights to the parties
on both sides of the lawsuit and resolved all issues raised by the
I

10e~ings.

The resolution of the damage question in this case is

thus not one about which Garden City may claim error.

Indeed,

Garden City has candidly acknowledged that this issue, if the only
one presented, would not be pursued on appeal (Response to Motion
for Summary Disposition, p. 3) •
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CONCLUSION
It was demonstrated at trial that insufficient continue.
public use of the lane in question had occurred to imply a
tion under §27-12-89, Utah Code Ann.

(1953).

~fil~

Likewise, it was

demonstrated that the lane in question, prior to 1972, lay to tilt!
south of the south boundary of Kohlers' property.

The Memoranduri

Decision entered by the Court found in favor of the Kohlers on 1x)
points.

The rulings on both points are reasonable and find subst i

tial support in the evidence.
Garden City has not demonstrated that Judge Christofferj
was arbitrary or that he abused his discretion.

Likewise,

I

tl~

1

have demonstrated no error which would act to their substantial I

I
prejudice.

On the basis of the record in this case and the argu·I

ments made above, it is respectfully submitted that the Judgment1
the trial court awarding injunctive and monetary relief to the i
!
Kohlers must be affirmed.

I £../A-

I

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of January, 1981.i

i

c;:;Q~

Edwin c. Barnes
CLYDE I PRATT I GIBBS

& CAHOON

Bryce E. Roe
David E. Leta
ROE & FOWLER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Respondents Kohler
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